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Abstract: The effect of corruption on airport productive efficiency is analyzed using an 
unbalanced panel data of major European airports from 2003 to 2009. We first compute the 
residual (or net) variable factor productivity using the multilateral index number method and 
then apply robust cluster random effects model in order to evaluate the importance of 
corruption. We find strong evidence that corruption has negative impacts on airport operating 
efficiency; and the effects depend on the ownership form of the airport. The results suggest that 
airports under mixed public-private ownership with private majority achieve lower levels of 
efficiency when located in more corrupt countries. They even operate less efficiently than fully 
and/or majority government owned airports in high corruption environment. We control for 
economic regulation, competition level and other airports’ characteristics. Our empirical results 
survive several robustness checks including different control variables, three alternative 
corruption measures: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index, Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) and Control of Corruption Index (CCI). The empirical findings have 
important policy implications for management and ownership structuring of airports operating 
in countries that suffer from higher levels of corruption. 
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Highlights 
 
 We analyze the effect of corruption on operating efficiency of European airports 
 Corruption has negative impact on airport operating efficiency 
 Airports under mixed public-private ownership with private majority achieve lower levels 
of efficiency when located in more corrupt countries 
 Airports under mixed public-private ownership with private majority operate less 
efficiently than fully and/or majority government owned airports in high corruption 
environment 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the relationship between airport efficiency and corruption in Europe. The 
determinants of airport efficiency have been largely analyzed in the literature. Studies found that 
ownership forms (Oum, Adler and Yu, 2006; Georges Assaf and Gillen, 2012; Adler and Liebert, 2014), 
the level of competition (Chi-Lok and Zhang, 2009; Malighetti et al. 2009), economic regulation (Georges 
Assaf and Gillen, 2012; Adler and Liebert, 2014) and institutional arrangements (Oum, Yan and Yu, 
2008), among others, affect the performance and productivity of airports. The impacts of corruption on 
airport cost efficiency have received limited attention.  
To our knowledge, the study by Yan and Oum (2014) appears to be the only one that investigates 
the effects of corruption on productivity and input allocation of airports. Using the case of major 
commercial US airports, their findings reveal that corruption negatively influences airport productivity: in 
more corrupt environments airports become less productive and tend to use more contracting-out to 
replace in-house labor. Nonetheless, their empirical analyses are limited to the US airports, which have 
limited forms of governance. US airports are owned and operated either by a branch of government 
(mostly municipal or metropolitan government) or through an airport or port authority set up by 
government. In this study, we extend the analysis of Yan and Oum (2014) to include different forms of 
airport management and ownership, including mixed public-private ownership with private minority, 
mixed public-private ownership with private majority and fully private ownership.  
In recent years, the private-sector participation in airport management and/or ownership has become 
a worldwide trend. Starting from the seven major airports in UK including Heathrow, Gatwick and 
Stansted airports in 1987, many airports in Europe are fully or partially privatized and/or in the process of 
being privatized.6 The main goal of airport privatization is to allow for easier access to private sector 
financing and investment, and to improve operating efficiency (Oum, Adler and Yu, 2006). We argue that 
privatized airports operating in corrupt environments may not achieve higher levels of efficiency because 
the incentives for managers to pursue efficiency goals are lower. Furthermore, private sector managers 
have more autonomy to change the allocation of inputs compared with bureaucrats, then they may focus 
on deriving personal benefits.  
Our research is motivated by the literature on the effects of corruption on firm performance, and 
the empirical findings of Yan and Oum (2014)7 and Dal Bò and Rossi (2007)8 on the negative correlation 
between corrupt environments and firm productivity. Corruption, which is defined as the misuse of public 
resources for private gains (Svensson, 2005) is a major source of economic inefficiency, as it diverts 
scarce resources from their most productive use. Furthermore, corruption is found to divert firms’ 
managerial efforts from productive activities to rent-seeking activities including political connection 
building (Fisman, 2001; Svensson, 2003; Clarke and Xu, 2004; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Dal Bò and 
Rossi, 2007; Cai, Fang and Xu, 2011). This study attempts to contribute to both the literature on the 
influence of corruption on economic performance at the micro level and the literature on the efficiency of 
airports.  
We use airports located in Europe to investigate our research question. The corruption levels of 
European organizations are relatively lower compared with the rest of the world; however evidence show 
that corruption remains a major concern in the European countries. Empirical findings of Hessami (2014) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For example, majority stakes in Copenhagen Kastrup, Vienna International, and Rome's Leonardo Da Vinci Airports have 
been sold to private owners.  
7 Yan and Oum (2014) argue that in corrupt environments, bureaucrats have no strong incentives to pursue mandated tasks, 
leading to a loss of productivity for publicly owned airports. 
8 Dal Bò and Rossi (2007) argue that corrupt countries are strongly associated with more inefficient firms (public and private) 
in the sense that firms employ more inputs to produce a given level of output. 
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suggest that corruption in the broad sense of use of government office for private benefit is an issue in 
OECD countries and is not limited to low-income countries. Furthermore, the OECD (2014) reports that 
bribes are not just a problem for developing world: bribes are being paid to officials from countries at all 
stages of economic development. The report also reveals that bribes are usually paid to win public 
contracts from western organizations and most bribe payers and takers are from wealthy countries.  
The airport industry in Europe is not free from corruption scandals; for instance, the New York 
Times reported that a $183 million airport project in Spain has become a symbol of the “wasteful spending 
that has sunk Spain deep into the recession and the banking crisis”.9 Corruption was also exposed in the 
reconstruction of Terminal 2 at Germany’s Frankfurt Airport in 1996.10 More recently in 2014, bribery 
scandals hit the airport of Berlin Brandenburg (BER); bribes were suspected to have been paid by firms 
wanting to secure airport contracts.11  
We use an unbalanced panel data set consisting of 47 major airports from 27 European countries 
during the 2003-2009 period to empirically investigate the impacts of corruption on operating efficiency. 
Our main corruption measure is the country-level International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption 
index.12 The residual (or net) variable factor productivity purchased from the Air Transport Research 
Society (ATRS) is used as measure of airport operating efficiency. We find that corruption lowers airport 
managerial efficiency; and the impacts depend on the airport ownership form. Our results confirm the 
previous findings that privately owned airports, including majority and fully private ownership, are 
generally more efficient than majority and/or fully government owned airports. However, privately owned 
airports operate less efficiently than their publicly owned counterparts in high corruption environment. We 
control for the form of regulation prevalent across European airports, levels of competition, airport 
characteristics, and potential shocks that may affect airport efficiency during the 2003-2009 period. Our 
empirical results withstand several robustness checks including different control variables, three 
alternative corruption measures: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index, Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) and Control of Corruption Index (CCI) and change in the ownership categories.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the literature on 
corruption and airport efficiency. Section 3 presents the methodology for computing airport efficiency and 
assessing the impacts of corruption on the efficiency. Data sets are described in Section 4 and Section 5 
defines the variables used in the analysis. The empirical results are presented in Section 6, followed by 
some robustness checks in Section 7. Finally, conclusions are given in section 8. 
2. Literature Review 
Corruption influences economic performance at both macro and micro levels. The impacts of corruption 
on economic performance at the macro level are considered in Schleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro 
(1995), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Wei (2000), Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Sanyal and Samanta 
(2008). These studies reveal that corruption negatively affects investment and economic growth.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The management of the airport of Castellón has been questioned since the airport has not received a single scheduled flight 
since its inauguration in 2011. See The New York Times (July 19, 2012): “In Spain, a symbol of ruin at an airport to 
Nowhere” 
10 See The Financial Times (July 2, 1996): “German Airport Corruption Probe Deepens: Five Jailed and 20 Companies under 
Investigation” and Reuters Business Report (September 25, 1996): “German corruption wave prompts action”, reported in 
Rose-Ackerman (1999). 
11 For more information, see The Local: Germany’s news in English (May 28, 2014): “Bribery probe hits Berlin's scandal 
airport”. 
12 Similar as in Dal Bò and Rossi (2007), we use the ICRG corruption index as our main measure of corruption. The index 
possesses the advantages of transitivity compared with other indices including World Bank corruption index and/or 
Transparency International corruption index. 
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With respect to the effect of corruption on firm-level performance, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1991, 1993) show that corruption generates social losses because it props up inefficient firms and drives 
the allocation of talent, technology and capital away from the socially most productive uses. Dal Bó and 
Rossi (2007) investigate the role of corruption among the determinants of the efficiency of electricity 
distribution firms. Their theoretical model states that corruption increases the factor requirements of firms, 
as it diverts managerial effort away from factor coordination. They empirically find that more corruption 
in the country is strongly associated with more inefficient firms, and the magnitude of the effects of 
corruption is considerable. Fisman and Svensson (2007) empirically find that firm growth is negatively 
correlated to both rate of taxation and bribery. Their results reveal that corruption delays the development 
process to a much greater extent than taxation. Wren-Lewis (2013) confirms these findings, but argues 
that the participation of an independent regulatory agency reduces the correlation between corruption and 
efficiency.  
For the aviation industry, Yan and Oum (2014) theoretically investigate the effects of local 
government corruption on the cost of providing public goods, and find that the impact of corruption is 
contingent on the governance structure and institutional arrangements of airports. Based on US 
commercial airports, they empirically confirm their theoretical predictions that corruption lowers airport 
productivity and increases the ratio of non-labor variable input to labor input of airports. The differences 
in the effects of corruption between airport authorities and airports managed by local government are due 
to the internal organization structure such as decision-making and managers’ autonomy to allocate 
resources. As result, governance restructuring, which consists of transferring airport management from a 
local government to an airport authority may not necessarily lead to efficiency gains in corrupt 
environments.  
Yan and Oum (2014) limit their analysis to the US commercial airports. The US airports are 
subject to specific governance structure; they are mostly owned, managed and operated by local 
governments either as government branches or via airport authorities. Since the first privatization of 
British Airports Authority in 1987, airport governance restructuring has proliferated elsewhere in the 
world. The goal of our paper is to extend and confirm the findings of Yan and Oum (2014) to include 
other forms of ownership and governance. Airports in Europe are chosen to test the impact of corruption 
on efficiency of fully and partially privatized airports.  
Literature on airport efficiency identifies three different performance and productivity analysis 
methods for airports. These approaches include productivity Index Number method, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The multilateral index number method, the 
consistency of which with neoclassical theory of the firm first established by Caves, Christensen and 
Diewert (1982), uses total factor productivity (TFP) as measure of efficiency. TFP is defined as the ratio 
of output index to input index, and is easy to compute if firms use single inputs to provide single outputs. 
However, airports utilize multiple inputs such as labor, capital, and other resources to produce multiple 
services for both airlines and passengers. Similar as in Oum, Adler and Yu (2006) and Obeng, Assar and 
Benjamin (1992), the multilateral index number method proposed by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert 
(1982) can be used to aggregate inputs and outputs.13 In the past, many studies including Hooper and 
Hensher (1997), Nyshadham and Rao (2000) have used TFP approach to evaluate airport performance. 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric frontier method firstly proposed by 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). Based on linear programming method, DEA evaluates efficiency 
scores for firms (or Decision Marking Units) relative to an efficiency frontier, which is formed by 
enveloping the data on the frontier. While DEA assumes the continuity and convexity of the production 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 TFP assumes that firms are under constant returns to scale and are allocatively efficient. However, TFP requires input and 
output prices and quantities that are not always available. 
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possibility set, it allows for using physical measures of capital inputs such as terminal size, number and/or 
length of runway as approximation of capital inputs.14 Some applications of DEA to the aviation industry 
can be found in Gillen and Lall (1997), Adler and Berechman (2001), Martı ́n-Cejas (2002), Abbott and 
Wu (2002), Pels, Nijkamp and Rietveld (2001, 2003) and Barros and Sampaio (2004). 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is a parametric approach that uses regression equation to 
assess efficiency. Firstly developed by Aigner, Amemiya and Poirier (1976) and Meeusen and Van den 
Broeck (1977), SFA explains output as a function of inputs and a stochastic disturbance, which consists of 
two parts: a stochastic inefficiency and a traditional “noise term”. For the case of estimating production 
(cost) function the former is always negative (positive). Similar to DEA, SFA assumes the continuity and 
convexity of the production possibility set. SFA further assumes a particular form of inefficiency 
distribution and involves a specification of frontier function, which enables it to conduct hypothesis tests 
and distinguish the sources of efficiency growth. Tsionas (2003), Pestana Barros (2009), Assaf (2009, 
2010), Marques and Barros (2010), Brissimis, Delis and Tsionas (2010) and Suzuki et al. (2010) are 
among the many SFA applications. Liebert and Niemeier (2010) provide an interesting review of all three 
approaches. The TFP approach is chosen for the purposes of this study. 
3. Methodology 
To investigate the effect of corruption on airport efficiency, a two-stage procedure is used. The first stage 
considers the multilateral index number approach to evaluate the residual (or net) variable factor 
productivity (rvfp) — our measure of airport operating efficiency. The second stage specifies a regression 
analysis that explains airport efficiency as a linear function of corruption index and a set of business 
environmental factors. 
3.1 Residual (or net) variable factor productivity (rvfp) 
The residual (or net) variable factor productivity (rvfp) computed by Air Transport Research Society 
(ATRS, 2011) is used as measure of airport true managerial efficiency.  
To obtain the residual (or net) variable factor productivity (rvfp), we first compute the variable 
factor productivity (vfp) index, which is defined as the ratio of aggregate outputs to aggregate inputs. 
Since airports utilize multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs, we apply the multilateral index number 
method, devised by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) to aggregate the inputs and outputs. 
The number of aircraft movements (ATMs), passenger volumes and non-aeronautical revenues are 
considered to aggregate outputs.15 It is noteworthy that demand for non-aeronautical services is closely 
related and complementary to that for aeronautical services (Oum, Adler and Yu, 2006). Moreover, the 
non-aeronautical revenues account for a large and increasing portion of airport revenues.16 Thus, we need 
to include non-aeronautical revenues among aggregate outputs in order to circumvent serious bias in 
measuring airport operating efficiency.  
With respect to inputs, airports utilize multiple resources including labor input, purchased goods 
and materials, and purchased services (outsourcing and contracting out) to produce multiple services for 
airlines and passengers. Labor input is defined as the full-time equivalent number of employees directly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 One important drawback of DEA method is the lack of transitivity 
15 Air cargo services are generally handled by airlines, third-party cargo handling companies and others, which lease space 
and facilities from airports. Air cargo services are not considered as a separate output in this research, as airports derive a 
very small percentage of their income from direct service related to air cargo 
16 On average, the non-aeronautical activities including concessions, car parking, and numerous other services account for 
about half of the total airport’s revenue in our sample.  
 
 
4	  
paid for by the airport operators. The outsourced services for goods, services, and materials purchased 
directly by an airport are combined with all other inputs to form a so-called “soft-cost input”. We note that 
our efficiency measure does not consider capital inputs. It is almost impossible to assess capital inputs and 
expenditures accurately on a comparable basis. Besides, capital costs are usually quasi-fixed during a 
long-term period while the vfp accounts for a short and/or medium term period. 
The residual (or net) variable factor productivity (rvfp) is obtained by using a regression analysis, 
which consists of removing the effects of factors that cannot be controlled by airport managers at least in 
the short to medium term from the vfp index. These factors include the percentage of international 
passengers, cargo share, capacity constraint, average aircraft size, airport size and different 
macroeconomic shocks. The residual of the variable factor productivity index is deemed as more accurate 
for this research. 
3.2 Econometric model 
In the econometric section, we estimate a model that explains airport efficiency, measured by the residual 
(or net) variable factor productivity (rvfp) as a linear function of a set of potential business environmental 
variables. These variables include the country-level corruption index of the airport (CI), the airport’s 
ownership form (OF), an interaction between ownership and corruption, and a set of control variables (X). 
When the data structure is a sample of airports observed over several time periods (a panel dataset), the 
regression equation reads: 𝑟𝑣𝑓𝑝  !" = 𝛼 + 𝜆  𝐶𝐼!" +   𝑶𝑭′!"𝛽 + (𝐶𝐼 ! ∗ 𝑶𝑭′!")  𝛾 +   𝑿′!"𝛿 + 𝜀!" (eq.1) 
where rvfpit represents the residual (or net) variable factor productivity of airport i at time t. 𝐶𝐼!" 
corresponds to the country-level corruption index (CI) of airport i at time t and   𝑶𝑭′!" the ownership form. 
We include an interation between the corruption index and ownership form, (𝐶𝐼!" ∗ 𝑶𝑭!!") to capture the 
effects of corruption under different types of ownership. 𝑿′𝒊𝒕  denotes a set of control variables that 
potentially affect airport efficiency in addition to corruption, including the form of economic regulation 
that is prevalent across Europe, the level of competition across gateways and within the catchment area, 
whether the airport is used as airline hub and/or international gateway, whether the airport belongs to a 
group from a managerial perspective, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Another set of 
controls including indicators of institutional quality variables, a proxy of openness to trade and a measure 
of the importance of government in the economy are added to test the robustness of our results.17 Ɛit refers 
to an independent and identically distributed error term over the airport i and time t dimensions; 𝛼 is the 
regression’s intercept. The parameters 𝜆,𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿  represent the marginal effects of the explanatory variables. 
Given the panel structure of the equation, we estimate both pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and airport/time-specific random effects (RE) models. The pooled OLS model assumes common 
intercepts and slopes across airports and periods, and it produces consistent estimates when the data are 
poolable. 18 The random effects (RE) model assumes the intercept 𝛼 as being a random component. When 
appropriate, the RE estimator is usually better at capturing the individual and time heterogeneity and it can 
strongly improve the fit as compared to the pooled OLS model. Our econometric analysis also applies 
statistical tests that check the violation of fundamental hypotheses of the standard regression model 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 These variables are largely recognized in the literature as having a strong relationship with corruption. 
18 Checking the poolability assumption requires a sample size that allows running individual time-series regressions or cross-
sectional yearly regressions, see Hsiao (1986, Chapter 2). In our case, the lack of degrees of freedom prevented us to 
perform individual time-series regressions.  
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(heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependencies), which alters inference. We apply 
the required corrections when needed. Other tests are also conducted to compare the competing models 
and select the most appropriate one from a statistical viewpoint. 
4. Data description 
We compile data from 47 airports located in 27 European countries during the 2003-2009 period. The 
airport data comes from various sources including the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
Airport Council International (ACI), International Air Transport Association (IATA) and airport annual 
reports. Some of the data was obtained directly from the airports. Table 1 lists the airports included in the 
sample as well as the form of ownership that governs each airport during the 2003-2009 period.  
Table 1: List of airports 
Code Airport Country Time Period Ownership 
AMS Amsterdam Schiphol  Netherlands 2003-2007 100% government  
     2008-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
ARN Stockholm Arlanda  Sweden 2003-2009 100% government  
ATH Athens  Greece 2004-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
BCN Barcelona El Prat  Spain 2003-2009 100% government  
BHX Birmingham  United Kingdom 2003-2009 
Mixed public-private with private 
majority 
BRU Brussels  Belgium 2003-2004 100% government  
    2005-2009 Mixed public-private with private majority 
BTS  Bratislava Milan Rastislav Stafanik  Slovakia 2004-2009 100% government 
BUD Budapest Ferihegy  Hungary 2008-2009 Mixed public-private with private majority 
CDG Paris Charles de Gaulle  France 2004-2005 100% government 
     2006-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
CGN  Cologne/Bonn Konrad Adenauer  Germany 2004-2009 100% government  
CIA Rome Ciampino  Italy 2003 100% government 
     2004-2009 Mixed public-private with private majority 
CPH Copenhagen Kastrup Denmark 2003-2009 Mixed public-private with private majority 
DUB Dublin  Ireland 2003-2009 100% government 
DUS Dlughafen Dusseldorf  Germany 2003-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
EDI Edinburgh  United Kingdom 2003-2009 Fully private 
FCO Rome Leonardo Da Vinci/Fiumicino  Italy 2003-2009 
Mixed public-private with private 
majority 
FRA Frankfurt Main  Germany 2003-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
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GVA Geneva Cointrin  Switzerland 2003-2009 100% government  
HAJ Hannover-Langenhagen  Germany 2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
HAM Hamburg  Germany 2003-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
HEL Helsinki Vantaa  Finland 2003-2009 100% government  
IST Istanbul Ataturk  Turkey 2009 Mixed public-private with private majority 
KEF Keflavik  Iceland 2007, 2009 100% government  
LGW London Gatwick  United Kingdom 2003-2009 Fully private 
LHR Heathrow  United Kingdom 2003-2009 Fully private 
LIS Lisbon Portela  Portugal 2003-2009 100% government  
LJU Ljubljana  Slovenia 2007-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
LTN London Luton  United Kingdom 2009 
Mixed public-private with private 
majority 
MAD Madrid Barajas  Spain 2003-2009 100% government  
MAN Manchester  United Kingdom 2003-2009 100% government  
MLA Malta Malta 2003-2009 Mixed public-private with private majority 
MUC Munchen  Germany 2005-2009 100% government  
NAP Naples  Italy 2009 Mixed public-private with private majority 
NCE Nice Cote d'Azur  France 2009 100% government  
ORY 
  
Paris Orly  France 2004-2005 100% government  
   2006-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
OSL Oslo  Norway 2003-2009 100% government  
PRG Prague  Czech Republic 2003-2007 100% government  
RIX Riga  Latvia 2004-2009 100% government  
SOF Sofia  Bulgaria 2004-2009 100% government  
STN Stansted  United Kingdom 2003-2009 Fully private 
SZG Salzburg  Austria 2009 100% government  
TLL Tallinn  Estonia 2003, 2006-2009 100% government  
TRN Turin  Italy 2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
TXL Berlin Tegel  Germany 2007-2009 100% government  
VIE Vienna  Austria 2003-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
WA
W Warsaw Frederic Chopin  Poland 2003-2009 100% government  
ZRH Zurich  Switzerland 2003-2009 Mixed public-private with government majority  
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Notes: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority indicates that private companies hold more than 
50% of stakes. Mixed public-private ownership with government majority indicates that government holds more than 
50% of stakes. 100% government is also called public corporation.  
Among the sample of 47 airports during the 2003-2009 period, 5 were fully private, 7 were owned 
and/or operated by mixed public-private enterprises with private majority, 9 were owned and/or operated 
by mixed public-private enterprises with government majority, and 21 were owned and/or operated or by 
100% government (or public corporations).  
Five airports including Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS), Brussels (BRU), Rome Ciampino (CIA), Paris 
Charles de Gaulle (CDG) and Paris Orly (ORY) have experienced ownership and management 
restructuring during the period of concern. These airports were traditionally fully owned, managed and 
operated by governments. The majority of stakes of Rome Ciampino and Brussels airports were sold to 
private sector interests in 2004 and 2005, respectively. The management and ownership of Paris Charles 
de Gaulle, Paris Orly and Amsterdam Schiphol airports were transferred to mixed private-public 
enterprises with government majority in 2006, 2006 and 2008, respectively.  
5. Description of variables  
5.1 Variables in the efficiency analysis 
Details on the variables used for the efficiency analysis are summarized in Table 2. The output variables 
include the number of aircraft movements (ATMs), passenger volumes and non-aeronautical revenues. As 
for input variables, labor input, purchased goods and materials and purchased services (outsourcing and 
contracting out) are considered. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the airport efficiency analysis 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Output (thousands) 254 1.306 1.271 0.0539 5.813 
Number of runways 254 2.25  0.949  1 5 
% Non-aeronautical revenue 254 0.474 0.141 0.183 0.848 
Number of employees 254 2897 4450.92 136 30437 
Variable Factor Productivity (VFP) 254 1.120 0.419 0.335 2.472 
% International Passengers 254 0.797 0.188 0.278 1 
Cargo share 254 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.042 
Aircraft size (thousands) 254 4.401 0.269 3.343 4.967 
Low Cost Carriers (thousands) 254 0.319 0.467 0 1 
Terminal size (square metres) 254 190620.6 199602.8 8000 1000000 
Residual variable factor productivity 
(rvfp) 254 0.628 0.212 0.216 1.280 
Source: ATRS global airport performance benchmarking reports (2003- 2009). Units of measurement are 
in brackets. 
5.2  Variables in the econometric analysis 
5.2.1 Measures of corruption 
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Corruption, our main variable of interest, is defined as the misuse of public office for private gain 
(Svensson, 2005). We consider three indices of corruption drawn from three different sources: the 
corruption index computed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) provided by Transparency International and the Control of Corruption Index (CCI) delivered by the 
World Bank.19 All three indices are survey-based. 
The ICRG corruption index captures the likelihood and the expectations that government officials 
will demand special payment in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange 
controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans". Drawn from indicators assembled by panels of 
international experts, it evaluates corruption mainly within the political system. ICRG corruption index 
allows for comparison across countries and over time, therefore it is particularly well suited to our main 
objective. Besides, the ICRG corruption index is widely used in the economics literature (see for example, 
Knack and Keefer (1995), Dal Bò and Rossi (2007)). The original index ranges between zero (highly 
corrupt) and six (highly clean); so a higher corruption index corresponds to a less corrupt country.  
Both CPI and CCI are composite indices. While CPI looks at corruption in the public sector, CCI 
considers corruption in both public and private sectors. CPI corresponds to the average of ratings reported 
by a number of perception-based sources and business surveys20 carried out by a variety of independent 
and reputable institutions. However, CCI is drawn from a large set of data sources including a diverse 
variety of survey institutes, think tanks, and non-governmental and international organizations. Contrary 
to ICRG corruption index, CCI and CPI lack “transitivity”. Their country rankings can change 
substantially as one adds or drops one or more countries from the sample.21 The original CPI scores 
countries on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (highly clean) while the original CCI scores range 
from -2.5 (highly clean) to 2.5 (highly corrupt). 
Since it is not meaningful to compare original scores generated by each source, the corruption 
scores are rescaled between 0 and 10 by setting the value for the most corrupt country at 10 and the least 
corrupt country at 0. Table 3 compares the three alternative corruption indices in 2009.  
Table 3: Corruption Indices of the sample of countries - 2009 
Country 
ICRG 
Corruption 
Index 
Country CPI Country CCI 
Finland 0 Denmark 3.8 Denmark 0.15 
Denmark 1.25 Sweden 3.9 Sweden 0.58 
Iceland 1.25 Switzerland 4.1 Finland 0.58 
Sweden 2.5 Finland 4.2 Netherlands 0.83 
Netherlands 2.5 Netherlands 4.2 Iceland 0.97 
Austria 2.5 Iceland 4.4 Switzerland 0.99 
Norway 2.5 Norway 4.5 Norway 1.16 
Germany 2.5 Germany 5.1 Austria 1.54 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This analysis focuses on country-level corruption. The subjective indices, which are derived from fully convincing 
methodology, provide satisfactory country coverage during the 2003-2009 time period. In addition, the corruption 
perception surveys are relatively well suited to compare countries in terms of corruption because the sources all aim at 
measuring the degree of corruption, using identical methodology. Mauro (1995), Svensson (2006) discussed the validity and 
precision of subjective corruption indices.  
20 The surveys include questions relative to the misuse of public power for private benefits such as bribery by public officials, 
kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds. 
21 For more details on the methodology used by World Bank and Transparency International to compute CCI and CPI scores, 
readers can refer to http://www.worldbank.org and http://www.transparency.org. We note that Transparency International has 
improved its methodologies to compute CPI index since 2012 in order to allow for comparison over times. 
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France 2.5 Ireland 5.1 Ireland 1.63 
Belgium 2.5 Austria 5.2 Germany 1.71 
Switzerland 3.75 United Kingdom 5.4 United Kingdom 2.03 
United Kingdom 5 Belgium 6 Belgium 2.24 
Portugal 5 France 6.2 France 2.31 
Spain 5 Estonia 6.5 Portugal 3.00 
Ireland 6.25 Slovenia 6.5 Slovenia 3.01 
Malta 6.25 Spain 7 Spain 3.09 
Estonia 7.5 Portugal 7.3 Estonia 3.25 
Hungary 7.5 Malta 7.9 Latvia 3.29 
Slovenia 7.5 Hungary 8 Malta 3.29 
Poland 8.75 Poland 8.1 Poland 4.26 
Italy 8.75 Latvia 8.6 Hungary 4.39 
Slovakia 8.75 Slovakia 8.6 Slovakia 4.58 
Turkey 8.75 Turkey 8.7 Turkey 4.94 
Bulgaria 10 Italy 8.8 Greece 5.01 
Greece 10 Bulgaria 9.3 Italy 5.14 
Latvia 10 Greece 9.3 Bulgaria 5.54 
Notes: ICRG Corruption Index is the International Country Risk Guide’s corruption indicator (average over 12 
months). CPI is the Corruption Perception Index computed Transparency International and CCI compute the Control 
of Corruption Index by the World Bank. ICRG, CPI and CCI scores are rescaled so that each index ranges between 0 
and 10, with a higher score indicating higher corruption and a lower score indicating lower corruption.  
The country rankings and corruption scores are compared across the three sources. Regardless of 
the methodology used, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Iceland are the cleanest countries 
in our sample whereas Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Turkey and Slovakia are the most corrupt countries. The 
country rankings in the top and bottom ranges of the scores are quite robust with respect to the 
methodology. By contrast, the country rankings in the middle ranges including Italy, Ireland and Poland 
rankings are more sensitive to the source used. Nonetheless, the three corruption indices are highly 
correlated with each other.22 The correlation between CCI and CPI is the highest, indicating that both 
indices yield rather similar country rankings. 
5.2.2  Ownership form 
The applied literature has established the influence of the ownership form on airports’ operating 
efficiency. We explore this finding for European airports by including the ownership form of airport i at 
time t in the model. We observe 4 types of ownership in our sample of airports including (1) fully private 
ownership (2) mixed public-private ownership with private majority (above 50%) (3) mixed public-private 
ownership with government majority (above 50%) (4) 100% government or public corporation ownership. 
However, due to the limited data, we combine fully private ownership and mixed public-private 
ownership with private majority.23 Thus, we categorize ownership forms according to: (1) mixed public-
private ownership with private majority (including fully private) (2) mixed public-private ownership with 
government majority (above 50%) (3) 100% government or public corporation ownership. Ownership 
forms are modeled with the help of dummy variables. We denote mixed public-private ownership with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The correlation coefficients between ICRG index and CPI, ICRG index and CCI and CCI and CPI are 0.8803, 0.8875, 
0.9662, respectively.  
23 Seven of our sampled airports are owned and operated by mixed enterprises with private majority (50%) and five are fully 
privatized airports.  
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private majority as the reference category. We further enquire whether corruption has an effect that 
potentially depends on the ownership form by including interaction terms between corruption and 
ownership dummy variables. 
5.2.3  Economic regulation and competition 
Previous research has found that competition and economic regulation, individually or jointly affect 
airport efficiency (Chi-Lok, Yuen and Zhang, 2009; Assaf and Gillen, 2012; Malighetti et al., 2009; Adler 
and Liebert, 2014). Regarding economic regulation, airports in Europe are traditionally subject to rate of 
return or cost-based regulation. More recently there has been a trend towards implementing a form of 
incentive regulation — the price-cap regulation — when airports are privatized or semi-privatized (Gillen, 
Niemeier and Madrid, 2006). Both cost-based and price cap regulations can be set under a single or dual 
till regime. Following Adler and Liebert (2014), we classify the forms of airport economic regulation 
according to (1) no ex-ante regulation (2) single-till cost-plus regulation (3) dual-till cost-plus regulation 
(4) single-till price-cap regulation (5) dual-till price-cap regulation (6) charges set by airports (single and 
dual till).  
The proxy of airport competition is defined in line with Adler and Liebert (2014). The variable is 
based on the number of commercial airports with at least 150 000 passengers per annum within a 
catchment area of 100 km around the airport. Two levels of competition are considered: strong and weak. 
An airport is assumed to be facing weak competition at the regional level if there is no more than one 
additional airport within the catchment area, and strong competition if there are at least two additional 
airports within the catchment area. In addition, a hub airport that serves as a regional or international 
gateway is classified as facing strong competition, regardless of its local catchment area. Due to the lack 
of information, we are not able to account for different product diversification strategies such as low cost 
carrier traffic. As Adler and Liebert (2014) pointed out, this measure of competition only indicates an 
upper level of likely competition across airports. 
5.2.4  Airport characteristics 
We include a set of control variables that capture the major characteristics of our sample of airports. These 
variables consist of the status of the airport as a hub and/or international gateway24, whether the airport 
belongs to a group from a managerial perspective, and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The 
controls are included in the model with the help of dummy variables. GDP per capita would capture time 
and country-specific macroeconomic factors such as productivity shocks. Details on variables used in the 
econometric analysis are summarized in Table 1 in the Annex.  
6. Empirical results 
The first part consists of a discussion on airport efficiency results. In the second part, we analyze the 
impacts of corruption and other factors on the airport operating efficiency.  
6.1 Estimates from the efficiency analysis  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Hub airports may possess advantages in terms of efficiency because of their size and location, therefore we include a 
dummy variable to capture the status of the airport as an international and/or regional hub. 
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This study uses the residual (or net) variable factor productivity as a measure of airport operating 
efficiency. Efficiency scores of the sample of airports are listed in Table 4.  
Table 4: Residual (or net) variable factor productivity (rvfp) efficiency scores 
Airport 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AMS 0.763 0.921 0.827 0.758 0.743 0.720 0.651 
ARN 0.789 0.984 0.641 0.643 0.694 0.509 0.426 
ATH - 1.244 0.715 0.774 0.719 0.769 1.059 
BCN 0.828 1.051 0.959 0.924 1.101 1.032 0.655 
BHX 0.948 0.655 0.713 0.668 0.643 0.646 0.675 
BRU 0.639 0.670 0.783 0.790 0.803 0.888 0.906 
BTS - 0.329 0.402 0.341 0.309 0.359 0.391 
BUD - - - - - 0.578 0.457 
CDG - 0.735 0.720 0.694 0.834 0.769 0.709 
CGN - 0.284 0.297 0.309 0.284 0.306 0.328 
CIA 0.932 0.779 0.794 0.802 0.849 0.684 0.691 
CPH 0.872 0.931 0.817 1.280 1.128 0.984 1.040 
DUB 0.497 0.855 0.793 0.745 0.746 0.696 0.618 
DUS 0.573 0.506 0.433 0.395 0.402 0.402 0.406 
EDI 0.486 0.582 0.560 0.544 0.668 0.851 0.750 
FCO 0.630 0.583 0.547 0.663 0.712 0.607 0.626 
FRA 0.393 0.496 0.471 0.421 0.450 0.398 0.352 
GVA 0.715 0.749 0.783 0.847 0.824 0.944 0.903 
HAJ - - - - - - 0.727 
HAM 0.350 0.495 0.496 0.503 0.474 0.503 0.508 
HEL 0.520 0.610 0.600 0.558 0.494 0.431 0.391 
IST - - - - - - 0.985 
KEF - - - - 0.326 - 0.627 
LGW 0.565 0.639 0.596 0.492 0.635 0.562 0.518 
LHR 0.548 0.612 0.550 0.390 0.519 0.419 0.416 
LIS 0.569 0.596 0.700 0.741 0.726 0.966 0.663 
LJU - - - - 0.540 0.611 0.657 
LTN - - - - - - 0.658 
MAD 0.772 0.980 0.936 0.889 1.116 1.073 0.704 
MAG     0.541 0.544 0.477 
MAN 0.511 0.746 0.518 0.512 0.577 0.515 0.511 
MLA 0.443 0.505 0.557 0.536 0.514 0.561 0.587 
MUC - - 0.339 0.345 0.324 0.330 0.310 
NAP - - - - - - 0.654 
NCE - - - - - - 0.849 
ORY - 0.445 0.365 0.419 0.547 0.502 0.473 
OSL 0.760 0.709 0.963 1.067 1.059 1.150 1.116 
PRG 0.432 0.425 0.822 0.511 0.490 - - 
RIX - 0.216 0.325 0.388 0.432 0.382 0.462 
SOF - 0.322 0.375 - - 0.422 0.401 
STN 0.670 0.747 0.710 0.587 0.649 0.642 0.619 
SZG - - - - - - 0.502 
TLL 0.436 - - 0.477 0.472 0.475 0.568 
TRN - - - - - - 0.609 
TXL - - - - 0.389 0.329 0.314 
VIE 0.490 0.503 0.527 0.537 0.495 0.536 0.557 
WAW 0.387 0.487 0.456 0.454 0.483 0.422 0.355 
ZRH 0.732 0.784 0.786 0.891 0.858 0.892 0.961 
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Notes: "-" indicates that the rvfp score of the airport for that year is not available in the dataset.  
The scores vary from 0.216 (the least efficient) to 1.28 (the most efficient). The average efficiency 
score goes from 0.616 in 2003 to 0.613 in 2009, with around 42% of all airports categorized as relatively 
efficient.  
Except for Brussels airport (BRU), none of the airports in the sample consistently improved their 
efficiency over time. Between 2003 and 2009, Brussels increased its score from 0.639 to 0.906. The 
private sector participation in the management and ownership of Brussels airport in 2005 may contribute 
to consistently maintain its improvement in terms of efficiency.  
Amsterdam (AMS), Dublin (DUB), Stockholm (ARN) and Helsinki (HEL) airports enhanced their 
efficiencies between 2003 and 2004, but consistently exhibit an efficiency decrease between 2004 and 
2009. By contrast, Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG), Rome Fiumicino (FCO), Gatwick (LGW), Manchester 
(MAN), Paris Orly (ORY), Stansted (STN), Vienna (VIE) and Warsaw (WAW) airports appear to have 
relatively constant efficiency scores between 2003 and 2009. For some airports including Amsterdam, 
Paris Charles de Gaulle and Paris Orly, the minor participation of private sectors in the airport 
management and ownership does not necessarily lead to efficiency gains.  
Copenhagen airport (CPH) is found as the most efficient airport among the sample of European 
airports between 2003 and 2009, with an average operating efficiency of 1.007. The top performers during 
the 2003-2009 period include Istanbul (IST), Oslo (OSL), Barcelona (BCN) and Madrid (MAD), with 
average efficiency scores of 0.985, 0975, 0.936 and 0.924, respectively. The airports of Cologne-Bonn 
(CGN), Munich (MUC), Berlin (TXL), Bratislava (BTS), Riga (RIX) and Sofia (SOF), by contrast, appear 
to be the least relatively efficient airports in the sample, with average scores less than 0.4. Cologne-Bonn 
suffers from excess airside capacities despite the extensive cargo operations resulting from its position as 
the European hub for Germanwings, FedEx Express and UPS Airlines (Adler and Liebert, 2014). 
6.2 Econometric results 
Statistical tests show that the Random Effect (RE) model is the most appropriate, and its Pooled OLS 
counterpart delivers similar results without providing efficiency gains in the estimates. 25 We notice in 
Table 5 that the RE model explains a much higher share of the total variance of the dependent variable (R 
Squared) than the pooled OLS regression, and its Adjusted R Squared is much larger as well. Therefore, 
the RE model is superior in terms of within-sample goodness-of-fit. The Fisher tests accept the absence of 
time-fixed effects in both pooled OLS and RE models, indicating that no common significant shocks have 
affected the efficiency of European airports during the period of scrutiny.26  
We report the estimation results from the pooled OLS model in column (2) of Table 5 and the ones 
from the RE model in column (3). The estimation results from the RE model are used as the basis for our 
analysis. Given that both models display strong heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals, 
robust standard errors are stated in parenthesis.27 
Table 5: Estimation results using pooled OLS and Random Effects (RE) models 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects displays a statistic of Fisher value of 161.32 and associated p-value of 
0.000, indicating that Random effects model is preferred to Pooled OLS.  
26 The statistics of Fisher (and their associated p-value) for Pooled OLS and RE models are 1.58 (0.174) and 6.91(0.329), 
respectively indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that year effects are insignificant.  
27 We employ cluster-robust standard errors as recommended by Wooldridge (2002). 
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Dependent variable: residual (or net) 
variable factor productivity (rvfp) Pooled OLS Random Effects (RE) 
Corruption Index (ICRG Index) -0.046*** -0.041*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Ownership form Base: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority 
Government majority (above 50%) -0.318*** -0.332*** 
 (0.116) (0.098) 
Public corporation (100% 
government) -0.230** -0.254** 
 (0.111) (0.101) 
Ownership form*Corruption Index 
(ICRG Index) 
 
Base: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority * ICRG Index 
 
Government majority* ICRG Index 0.064*** 0.048** 
 (0.023) (0.019) 
Public corporation* ICRG Index 0.015 0.028 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
Regulation Base: No ex-ante regulation  
Cost-plus, single till 0.188** 0.136 
 (0.080) (0.092) 
Cost-plus, dual till -0.093 -0.003 
 (0.084) (0.079) 
Incentive, single till -0.040 -0.043 
 (0.057) (0.060) 
Incentive, dual till -0.128* -0.097 
 (0.069) (0.069) 
Charges set by airports (single & 
dual till) 0.130 0.076 
 (0.080) (0.089) 
Competition Base: Weak competition  
Strong  -0.177*** -0.097 
 (0.050) (0.060) 
Status as a hub and/or international 
gateway 0.082 0.039 
 (0.052) (0.060) 
Airport group management dummy 0.064 0.045 
 (0.054) (0.051) 
GDP per capita 0.002** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.865*** 0.823*** 
 (0.111) (0.128) 
R-Square 0.384 0.820 
Adjusted R-Square 0.345 0.772 
Number of observation 254 254 
Notes: "***", "**", "*" denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard error 
associated to each coefficient is stated in parenthesis. We dropped "mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority (including fully private)" dummy, "the interaction between mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority and corruption index", "no ex-ante regulation dummy" and "weak competition dummy" in all regressions to 
avoid multicollinearity.  
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First, we notice that the partial effects of the main variables of interest — corruption, ownership and 
the interaction terms between corruption and ownership — are highly significant in the RE model and that 
the signs and magnitudes remain rather robust in the pooled OLS model. Given that the influence of 
corruption on airport operating efficiency depends on the ownership form, we ran a regression of rvfp on 
the corruption index, the ownership dummies and the business environmental factors without including 
the interaction terms in the regression. We found no significant effects of corruption on rvfp.28 This 
stresses the importance of accounting for the interactions to uncover the effect of corruption on airport 
efficiency.  
As shown in Table 5, the impact of corruption on airports’ efficiency is negative, and its effect is 
significant at the 1% level in both RE and pooled OLS specifications. This result suggests that corruption 
has a negative impact on airport efficiency under mixed public-private ownership with private majority 
(the default ownership category). Privately owned airports located in less corrupt countries operate more 
efficiently than the ones situated in more corrupt countries. An increase in one point29 in the corruption 
index decreases the residual (or net) variable factor productivity of 0.04 units. This negative influence of 
corruption on efficiency is consistent with previous literature in other sectors (see for example Dal Bò and 
Rossi (2007)). Indeed, corruption is found to lower productivity through a diversion of managerial efforts 
away from running productive activities. In a high corruption environment, airport managers would have 
more incentives to use bribes when they channel resources to establish lobbies and connections. Then, 
poor governance and culture of cronyism in highly corrupt countries spur managers of privately owned 
airports to focus less on airport productivity objectives, leading eventually to lower airport efficiency.  
The effects of corruption on mixed public-private ownership with government majority and 100% 
government ownership are obtained by summing the estimated coefficient of the corruption index to the 
estimated coefficients’ vector of the interaction terms (i.e., 𝜆 + 𝛾 if we refer to eq.1). For each ownership 
category, the impact is significant if the sum is statistically different from zero. In the RE specification, 
mixed ownership with government majority displays a sum of 0.007, whereas fully public ownership 
exhibits a sum of -0.013. In both cases, the Fisher test30 concludes that the sum is not significantly 
different from zero at the required cutoffs. Corruption has no effects on the efficiency of both publicly 
owned airports.  
In a high corruption environment, privately owned airports appear to operate less efficiently than 
publicly owned airports. This finding lines up with the work of Yan and Oum (2014) with respect to the 
autonomy of airport managers in allocating inputs. Yan and Oum (2014) argue that local tax revenues can 
fund the operations of a government-owned airport, and that the funding source restricts the airport’s 
flexibility to change inputs allocation. 31 By contrast, managers of privately owned airports have enough 
managerial autonomy to allocate inputs, so they can either pursue cost efficiency objectives or divert 
resources to their personal benefits. Therefore, managers of privately owned airports have more freedom 
to pursue personal goals via changing the allocation of inputs than those of publicly owned airports when 
corruption is high.  
With respect to the ownership form, the estimation results reveal that privately owned airports 
generally provide higher efficiency scores than publicly owned airports. The effect of each ownership 
category is derived from the sum of the estimated coefficient of the ownership dummy and its interaction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 We do not report here the estimation results for the sake of parsimony. 
29 We need to be careful in the interpretation of these results. As pointed out by Mauro (1995), when using perception indexes, 
it is not clear if the difference between the corruption grade of one and two is the same as between 4 and 5.  
30 The Fisher statistics (and their p-values) for mixed ownership with government majority and 100% public ownership are 
1.60 (0.206) and 0.58 (0.446), respectively. In both cases, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, suggesting that the sum of 
the coefficients is equal to zero. Corruption has no effects on efficiency of both types of ownership.  
31 Yan and Oum (2014) state that bureaucrats treat inputs as exogenous for the US commercial airports. 
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with corruption index, (i.e. 𝛽 + 𝛾 if we refer to eq. 1). The sums for mixed public-private ownership with 
government majority and 100% government ownership are -0.284 and -0.227, respectively. The Fisher 
tests 32 confirm the negative and highly significant coefficients for both majority and fully public 
ownership. These results suggest that publicly owned airports are less efficient than privately owned 
airports in a highly clean environment, in line with the findings of Oum, Adler and Yu (2006) and Oum, 
Yan and Yu (2008). Allowing the private sectors to hold a majority stake in the airport management and 
ownership would improve operating efficiency in a low corruption society. As such, a change from 100% 
government ownership to mixed public-private ownership with private majority would lead to an 
efficiency gain of 0.274. 33  
The level of local and gateway competition appears to have no specific impact on airport efficiency, 
in line with Adler and Liebert (2014). This result may be explained by the approach used to define the 
level of competition. Chi-Lok and Zhang (2009) stressed that airports serve many different markets 
including long and short distance, transshipment, and origin-destination markets. However, we are not 
able to consider these different markets due to the lack of information. We thus may have ignored product 
diversification strategies.  
The coefficients of the form of regulation dummies vary across models but are not always 
statistically significant. In the pooled OLS specification, airports subject to cost-plus regulation with 
single till appear to be more statistically efficient than unregulated airports, while the ones subject to 
incentive regulation with dual till seem to be statistically less efficient. The RE model delivers different 
estimation results — none of the dummies are statistically significant — indicating that there is no 
difference between regulated and unregulated airports in terms of operating efficiency. Though some 
studies including Assaf and Gillen (2012), Adler and Liebert (2014) have emphasized the importance of 
accounting for the interaction between ownership, regulation and competition to explain airport operating 
efficiency, our study is limited to the analysis of the effects of corruption. Thus, we may have ignored the 
interaction between ownership, competition and regulation.34  
The status as hub and/or international gateway of the airport is not statistically significant in both 
Pooled OLS and RE models. This provides some indication that most of the hubs in our sample do not 
possess size and location advantages. We also find no significant impact of multi-airport management on 
airport efficiency, suggesting that airports included in our sample may not exploit economies of scale and 
learning effects when they operate with multiple units in the same region. Our findings do not support the 
argument by Malighetti, Martini, Paleari and Redondi (2009). 
At each stage of the estimation, we include time effects in the model, but the time effects were 
formally rejected in all cases. We note that the residual (or net) variable factor productivity already 
accounts for time effects.35 Therefore, different shocks that potentially affect airport efficiency including 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the 2008 financial crisis should be captured by the rvfp index.36 The coefficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The Fisher statistics (and their p-values) for mixed ownership with government majority and 100% public ownership are 
12.11 (0.0005) and 7.42 (0.006), respectively. These statistics confirm the rejection of the null hypothesis, indicating that the 
sum of the coefficients is different from zero. Both types of ownership have significant impacts on airport efficiency. 
33 The efficiency gain from privatization is obtained by using a regression of rvfp on ownership form dummies and other 
explanatory variables, and setting the “100% government” ownership as the reference category. Thus, the effect of a change 
in the ownership from 100% government to mixed public-private ownership with private majority on rvfp is explained by 
the estimated coefficient of the mixed ownership with private majority.  
34 This study focuses on the effects of corruption on airport operating efficiency. Competition, regulation and ownership 
variables are included in the model as control variables. 
35 In computing the rvfp index, we exclude factors that are beyond managerial control including year dummies. 
36 As result of the terror attacks, security requirements were legally altered in Europe, requiring substantial investments on the 
part of the airports. As for the financial crisis in 2008, it provoked large drops in demands. 
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of GDP per capita is positive and always statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting that airports 
operating in more developed countries are more efficient in general.  
7. Robustness checks 
7.1  Using additional sets of control variables 
In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we extend the controls in the 𝑋!" matrix of our equation 
(eq.1) to add country-specific institutional quality variables. This model is dubbed model II in Table 6. 
Lambsdorff (2003) emphasizes that corruption includes many different types of behavior, and 
decomposing it into governance-related subcomponents can identify the channels through which it affects 
productivity. Mauro (1995) argues that the efficiency of institutions is relevant for any firm operating in 
the country of interest, since they are assessed independently of macroeconomic variables. Therefore, we 
include government stability, quality of bureaucracy, internal and external conflict and law and order as 
indicators of institutional quality variables. 37 In model III of Table 6, another set of controls is added to 
model II: a proxy of openness to trade (share of imports in GDP) and a measure of the importance of 
government in the economy (share of central government revenues in GDP). The latter regressors are 
largely recognized in the literature as having a strong relationship with corruption. 38 Table 6 shows the 
estimation results using random effects specification. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.39 
Table 6: Estimation results using additional control variables 
Dependent variable: residual (or net) 
variable factor productivity (rvfp) model II model III 
Corruption Index (ICRG Index) -0.052*** -0.053*** 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
Ownership form Base: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority 
Government majority (above 50%) -0.279*** -0.291*** 
  (0.099) (0.097) 
Public corporation (100% government) -0.222** -0.214** 
  (0.101) (0.102) 
Ownership form*Corruption Index (ICRG 
Index) 
Base: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority * 
ICRG Index 
Government majority* ICRG Index 0.041** 0.046** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Public corporation* ICRG Index 0.026 0.025 
  (0.018) (0.019) 
Regulation Base: No ex-ante regulation 
Cost-plus, single till 0.099 0.128 
  (0.100) (0.101) 
Cost-plus, dual till -0.042 -0.030 
  (0.088) (0.085) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 We follow the definitions proposed by ICRG to specify the institutional quality variables. Bureaucratic quality signals the 
independence of administration from political pressure, the use of established mechanisms for recruiting and training, and 
the strength and expertise of government services. Government stability defines the government's ability to carry out its 
declared program(s) and its ability to stay in office. Law evaluates the strength and impartiality of the legal system while the 
Order scores the popular observance of the law. Ethnic tension considers the degree of tension within a country attributable 
to racial, nationality, or language divisions. Internal conflict evaluates political violence in the country and its actual or 
potential impact on governance whereas external conflict scores the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, 
ranging from non-violent external pressure to violent external pressure. 
38 See for example Mauro (1995), Dal Bò and Rossi (2007) 
39 Since all models display strong heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals, we employ cluster-robust standard 
errors as recommended by Wooldridge (2002). 
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Incentive, single till -0.084 -0.048 
  (0.074) (0.070) 
Incentive, dual till -0.135* -0.117 
  (0.076) (0.075) 
Charges set by airports (single & dual till) -0.024 0.036 
  (0.106) (0.094) 
Competition Base: Weak competition  
Strong -0.150** -0.126* 
  (0.074) (0.073) 
Status as a hub and/or international 
gateway 0.091 0.060 
  (0.065) (0.064) 
Airport group management dummy 0.025 0.021 
  (0.062) (0.062) 
GDP per capita 0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Institutional quality variables   
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.008 0.008 
  (0.009) (0.008) 
Law and Order 0.016 0.013 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
Ethnic tension -0.003 -0.005 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
Internal conflict 0.009 0.011 
  (0.010) (0.011) 
External conflict 0.009 0.012 
  (0.011) (0.010) 
Government Stability 0.003 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Openness to trade - -0.002 
   (0.001) 
Share of central government revenues - 0.005 
   (0.005) 
Intercept 0.699*** 0.792*** 
  (0.225) (0.139) 
Number of observations 252 254 
Notes: "***", "**", "*" denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard error 
associated to each coefficient is stated in parenthesis. We dropped "mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority (including fully private)" dummy, "the interaction between mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority and corruption index", "no ex-ante regulation dummy" and "weak competition dummy" in all regressions to 
avoid multicollinearity.  
The former results remain valid whatever the control variables, and in almost all extended models, 
the corruption impact on airport efficiency remains negative and significant at the 1% significance level. 
The negative coefficients of mixed public-private ownership with government majority and 100% 
government ownership confirm that privately owned airports are the most efficient in the absence of 
corruption. The interaction term between corruption index and mixed ownership with government 
majority keeps its positive and significant impact at the 5% level in both extended models. However, the 
statistical tests indicate that the overall effects of corruption on publicly owned airports including 100% 
and majority government owned airports remain insignificant.  
The effects of the form of regulation, competition level, hub status and airport group management 
dummies remain statistically insignificant. GDP per capita does not appear to have significant impacts. 
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When we include openness to trade and the share of government revenue to the model, the picture does 
not significantly change. We apply statistic tests to verify whether the overall impacts of the institutional 
variables, openness to trade and the share of central government revenues are significant, and the results 
show that these additional factors do not have significant effects.40 To sum up, our econometric results 
seem very robust across models. 
7.2 Using alternative corruption indices 
The use of alternative measures of corruption allows to check on the robustness of our results and to make 
sure that the latter are not driven by the use of a particular index. We then consider two other corruption 
measures including Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International and Control of 
Corruption Index of World Bank. Both are composite indices, which have the advantages to admit the 
biases of specific indices to cancel each other out, thereby determining an average opinion of corruption 
(Méon and Weill (2010)). Using the parsimonious specification from the RE estimator, Table 7 confirms 
that the previous main results are robust to other measures of corruption.41 
Table 7: Estimation results using Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International and 
Control of Corruption Index (CCI) of the World Bank  
 
Dependent variable: residual (or net) 
variable factor productivity (rvfp) 
Using CPI Index Using CCI Index 
Corruption Index  -0.044* -0.080*** 
 (0.024) (0.028) 
Ownership form Base: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority 
Government majority (above 50%) -0.495** -0.266** 
  (0.235) (0.119) 
Public corporation (100% government) -0.258* -0.273*** 
  (0.176) (0.103) 
Ownership form*Corruption Index 
 
Base: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority * 
Corruption Index 
Government majority*Corruption Index 0.072* 0.071 
 (0.039) (0.044) 
Public corporation*Corruption Index 0.026 0.062* 
 (0.027) (0.032) 
Regulation Base: No ex-ante regulation 
Cost-plus, single till 0.142 0.159 
  (0.098) (0.100) 
Cost-plus, dual till -0.003 0.031 
  (0.096) (0.096) 
Incentive, single till -0.052 -0.051 
  (0.094) (0.095) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 We test the null hypotheses that (a) the joint effects of the institutional quality variables are null and (b) the joint effects of 
openness to trade and share of central government revenues are null. Chi-squared displays statistics (and its p-value) of 6.10 
(0.41) and 2.37 (0.3063), respectively, suggesting that the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. 
41 The Fisher tests confirm that the coefficients of both interaction terms in each model are null, indicating that corruption has no 
effects on efficiency of publicly owned airports. 
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Incentive, dual till -0.083 -0.093 
  (0.098) (0.099) 
Charges set by airports (single & dual till) 0.051 0.117 
  (0.121) (0.124) 
Competition Base: Weak competition 
Strong -0.088 -0.107 
 (0.072) (0.072) 
Status as a hub and/or international 
gateway 0.037 0.040 
 (0.076) (0.077) 
Airport group management dummy 0.042 0.053 
 (0.072) (0.073) 
GDP per capita 0.002** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.866*** 0.793*** 
 (0.173) (0.123) 
Number of observations 253 254 
Notes: "***", "**", "*" denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard error 
associated to each coefficient is stated in parenthesis. We dropped "mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority (including fully private)" dummy, "the interaction between mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority and corruption index", "no ex-ante regulation dummy" and "weak competition dummy" in all regressions to 
avoid multicollinearity.  
7.3 Using different categories of ownership  
We want to test if our results are robust to the change in the ownership categories. For this purpose, we 
separate fully private ownership from mixed public-private ownership with private majority. Four types of 
ownership are then considered: (1) 100% government (or public corporation), (2) mixed public-private 
ownership with government majority (above 50%), (3) mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority (above 50%) and (4) fully private. The 100% government ownership is used as the reference 
category. The estimation results using the RE specifications are reported in Table 8, with robust standard 
errors in parenthesis.  
Table 8: Estimation results using different ownership categories 
Dependent variable: residual (or net) variable factor 
productivity (rvfp) Coefficient 
Corruption Index (ICRG Index) -0.013 
 (0.010) 
Ownership form Base: 100% government (public corporation) 
Government majority -0.075 
 (0.076) 
Private Majority 0.364*** 
 (0.102) 
Fully Private 0.016 
 (0.235) 
Ownership form*Corruption Index (ICRG Index) Base: 100% government *ICRG Index 
Government majority *ICRG Index 0.020 
 (0.015) 
Private majority* ICRG Index -0.041** 
 (0.020) 
Fully Private* ICRG Index 0.007 
 (0.053) 
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Form of regulation Base: No ex-ante regulation 
Cost-plus, single till 0.123 
  (0.095) 
Cost-plus, dual till -0.015 
  (0.080) 
Incentive, single till -0.032 
  (0.060) 
Incentive, dual till -0.112 
  (0.068) 
Charges set by airports (single & dual till) 0.076 
  (0.097) 
Competition Base: Weak Competition 
Strong -0.083 
 (0.063) 
Status as a hub and/or international gateway 0.018 
 (0.066) 
Airport group management dummy 0.059 
 (0.052) 
GDP per capita 0.002 
 (0.001) 
Intercept 0.592*** 
 (0.095) 
Number of observation 254 
Notes: "***", "**", "*" denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard error 
associated to each coefficient is stated in parenthesis. We dropped "100% government (or public corporation) 
ownership" dummy variable, "the interaction between 100% government ownership dummy and corruption index", 
"no ex-ante regulation dummy" and "weak competition dummy" in all regressions to avoid multicollinearity 
problem.  
As stated in Table 8, the coefficient of corruption index is negative but not statistically significant 
at the required levels, which suggests that corruption has no effects on fully government-owned airports 
(the reference category). This confirms our previous findings. With respect to the impact of corruption on 
rvfp in privately owned airports, our previous results hold only for mixed public-private ownership with 
private majority. The coefficients of both corruption index and interaction terms, as well as the statistic of 
Fisher42 confirm the negative relationship between rvfp and corruption for this ownership category. 
However, we find no significant effects for the other forms of ownership including fully private 
ownership. This result may be explained by the limitation of data on fully private airports included in our 
sample.  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient for mixed public-private ownership with 
private majority is consistent with our previous finding. Again, privatized airports exhibit higher 
efficiency scores than government owned airports in the absence of corruption. However, no significant 
difference is found between fully private, mixed public-private ownership with government majority and 
fully public ownership, in terms operating efficiency.  
7.4 Treating outliers  
Given the characteristics of our dataset, we would expect important outliers for some of the countries 
included in the sample. To address this potential issue, we drop from the sample: (1) extreme values of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The Fisher test displays a statistic of 9.37 with a p-value of 0.0022, suggesting that the overall effects of corruption on 
efficiency of majority private owned airports are negative and statistically significant at the 1% l level. 
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airport efficiency (rvfp), (2) airports that provide the largest values of rvfp, (3) airports that display the 
smallest values of rvfp and (4) airports that display the smallest and largest values of rvfp. Table 9 
compares the estimation results according to each specification using RE model, with robust standard 
error in parenthesis.  
Table 9: Estimation results using different set of sample 
Dependent variable: Residual (or 
net) variable factor productivity 
(rvfp) 
 
 
full sample 
drop the 
extreme 
values 
drop the 
largest 
airports 
drop the 
smallest 
airports 
drop the 
smallest and 
largest 
airports 
Corruption Index (ICRG Index) -0.041*** -0.037** -0.036** -0.037** -0.031* 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Ownership form Base: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority 
Government majority (above 50%) -0.332*** -0.312*** -0.270*** -0.299*** -0.232** 
 (0.098) (0.094) (0.104) (0.099) (0.105) 
Public corporation (100% 
government) -0.254** -0.249** -0.228** -0.195** -0.160 
 (0.101) (0.100) (0.111) (0.098) (0.114) 
Ownership form*ICRG Index Base: Mixed public-private ownership with private majority *ICRG Index 
Government majority* ICRG Index 0.048** 0.045** 0.043** 0.043** 0.037** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Public corporation* ICRG Index 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.022 0.021 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Regulation Base: No ex-ante regulation 
Cost-plus, single till 0.136 0.110 0.008 0.135* 0.013 
 (0.092) (0.085) (0.094) (0.077) (0.077) 
Cost-plus, dual till -0.003 -0.015 -0.014 0.028 0.016 
 (0.079) (0.074) (0.084) (0.070) (0.078) 
Incentive, single till -0.043 -0.051 -0.045 -0.082 -0.083 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (0.055) (0.054) 
Incentive, dual till -0.097 -0.106 -0.119* -0.093 -0.118* 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) (0.068) (0.070) 
Charges set by airports (single & 
dual till) 0.076 0.072 0.084 0.028 0.024 
 (0.089) (0.086) (0.091) (0.078) (0.076) 
Competition Base: Weak competition 
Strong -0.097 -0.068 -0.045 -0.073 -0.030 
 (0.060) (0.054) (0.061) (0.058) (0.059) 
Status as a hub and/or international 
gateway 0.039 0.028 0.008 0.035 -0.003 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.064) (0.061) (0.063) 
Airport group management dummy 0.045 0.046 0.035 0.013 -0.006 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.043) 
GDP per capita 0.002* 0.002 0.001 0.003** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.823*** 0.818*** 0.807*** 0.832*** 0.825*** 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.143) (0.127) (0.139) 
Number of observations 254 234 225 228 199 
Notes: "***", "**", "*" denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard error 
associated to each coefficient is stated in parenthesis. We dropped "mixed public-private ownership with private 
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majority (including fully private)" dummy, "the interaction between mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority and corruption index", "no ex-ante regulation dummy" and "weak competition dummy" in all regressions to 
avoid multicollinearity.  
Our results are robust to whatever the set of sample. The coefficient of corruption index remains 
negative and statistically significant at least at the 10% level in each specification. Corruption negatively 
affects efficiency of privately owned airports. Except for the last sample in which we drop the smallest 
and largest airports, in the absence of corruption the publicly owned airports including 100% government 
ownership and mixed public-private ownership with government majority appear less efficient than 
privately owned airports. However, the coefficients of the corruption index, the interaction terms as well 
as the Fisher tests confirm that in high corruption environment the mixed public-private ownership with 
private majority are the least efficient. 
 
8. Conclusions  
While a number of studies have analyzed the determinants of airport efficiency, the role of corruption has 
attracted limited attention. The aim of this research is to investigate the effects of corruption on operating 
efficiency of 47 major European airports from 2003 to 2009, using a two-stage approach. In the first stage, 
the multilateral index number method is applied to compute our efficiency measure, the residual (or net) 
variable factor productivity (rvfp) index. The same index method is used by Air Transport Research 
Society (ATRS, 2011) to assess and compare managerial efficiency of airports worldwide. In the second 
stage, the effect of corruption on the airport efficiency is assessed using robust cluster random effects 
model. We use the corruption index from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as our main measure 
of corruption. The estimation results are consistent across the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
random effects (RE) models but the latter provides better fit of the data.  
We find strong evidence that corruption has negative impacts on airport’s operating efficiency, and 
the impacts depend on the airport's ownership form. Airports owned and operated by mixed public-private 
enterprises with private majority (including 100% private) are expected to be the most efficient in a 
society where corruption is low. However, they exhibit lower levels of efficiency compared with airports 
operated by mixed public-private enterprises with government majority and fully government owned 
airports in highly corrupt countries. These results reflect the differences in autonomy of airport managers 
when they allocate and channel resources. Accordingly, managers of privately owned airports have more 
freedom to allocate resources than bureaucrats. We argue that poor governance and culture of cronyism in 
highly corrupt countries would provide incentives for private sector managers to focus heavily on rent 
seeking instead of focusing on airport productivity objectives, and eventually lead to lower airport 
efficiency. Also, there is more room for corruption to creep in because the majority of privatized firms 
avoid regular audits that the government owned enterprises are usually subject to. 
Our empirical findings survive several robustness checks. To deal with potential omitted variable 
issues, we control for the form of regulation prevalent across European airports, competition level within 
the catchment area and across gateways, airport characteristics, including airport status as a hub and/or 
international gateway, whether the airport management belongs to a group from a managerial perspective 
and GDP per capita. We extend the set of controls to include country-specific institutional quality 
indicators and variables that vary across countries and over time such as a measure of openness to trade 
(share of imports in GDP) and a measure of the importance of government in the economy (share of 
central government revenues in GDP). The main results hold despite using two additional alternative 
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measures of corruption: Corruption Perception index (cpi) established by Transparency International and 
Control of Corruption index (cci) provided by the World Bank.  
Findings from this paper have important policy implications for government and airport managers. 
Our empirical findings suggest that high corruption in the country might be a hindrance to airport 
efficiency. Thus, governments who want to transfer airport management and ownership to private sectors 
may want consider the levels of corruption in the country and allocate adequate resources to reduce 
corruption.  
The corruption levels of European countries are relatively lower compared with many parts of the 
world. Nonetheless, corruption has become a major concern since the number of officials and state-owned 
companies from European countries involved in bribery cases and other corruption acts has been 
increasing. This research, which is limited to Europe, can be extended to airports in other regions 
including Asia, Oceania and more specifically developing countries and highly corrupted regions. Major 
air infrastructures in developing countries are funded by the World Bank and/or funding agencies. If 
corruption not only causes misuse of resources but also impacts on airport operating efficiency, the 
recipient countries may not be able to pay back the loans. As such, the infrastructure projects lenders may 
want to retain a certain percentage of their loans, and use it for the country to set up clean project bidding 
and tendering processes with proper checks and balances, to educate and train officials and employees, 
and auditing during the project implementation period as well as ex-post auditing. 
Furthermore, we use a specific airport efficiency index namely the residual (net) variable factor 
productivity index, which accounts for the short and medium term airport operating efficiency and does 
not consider capital investment. Future research is advised to consider alternative measures of efficiency 
that include capital investment.  
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Appendix  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Observation Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Min Max 
ICRG Corruption Index 254 4.998 2.649 0 10 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 253 5.843 1.671 3.4 9.7 
Control of Corruption Index (CCI) 254 2.251 1.386 0.000 5.719 
GDP per capita (in current US Dollars) 254 35 204.5 16 199.18 2 641.79 95 189.9 
Openness to trade (in %) 254 43.099 17.175 23.875 91.575 
Share of central government revenues in 
GDP (in %) 252 34.014 6.398 17.955 51.234 
Quality of Bureaucracy 254 2.323 3.032 0 10 
Law and Order 254 2.550 2.019 0 10 
Ethnical tension 254 5.057 2.419 0 10 
Internal Conflict 254 3.679 2.227 0 10 
External Conflict 254 3.502 2.749 0 10 
Government Stability 254 3.887 1.567 0 10 
Dummy variables Frequency Percent Cumulative Min Max 
Ownership form      
100% government or public corporation 126 49.61 49.61 0 1 
Mixed ownership with government 
majority (above 50%) 56 22.04 71.65 0 1 
Mixed ownership with private majority 
(including 100% private) 72 28.35 100 0 1 
Form of regulation      
Unregulated 51 20.08 20.08 0 1 
Cost-plus, single till 50 19.69 39.76 0 1 
Cost-plus, dual till 29 11.42 51.18 0 1 
Incentive, single till 55 21.65 72.83 0 1 
Incentive, dual till 33 12.99 85.83 0 1 
Charges set by airports (single & dual till) 21 8.27 94.09 0 1 
Not available 15 5.91 100 0 1 
Belongs to an airport group from a 
management perspective      
Yes 111 43.70 43.70 0 1 
No 143 56.3 100 0 1 
Competition      
Strong 164 64.57 64.57 0 1 
Weak 90 35.43 100 0 1 
Hub Status      
Yes 215 84.65 84.65 0 1 
No 39 15.35 100 0 1 
Source: ATRS annual reports (2003- 2009). International Country Risk Guide - The Political Risk Ratings (2009). 
Transparency International (2009). The World Bank Indicators (2009). Units of measurement are in brackets. 
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